We revisit the subject of country-level macroeconomic adjustment in the euro area in the absence of autonomous monetary and exchange rate policy. We discuss how the procyclical real interest rate mechanism and the competitiveness channel of adjustment interact with various aspects of cross-country heterogeneity. Long-term dierentials in steady-state ination (due to structural factors, such as Balassa-Samuelson eect) and natural interest rate do not rule out the existence of an equilibrium, as long as they are oset by additional price level dierentials. GMM estimates of the parameters of our stylized New Keynesian model imply that the competitiveness channel is eectively at work in EMU 12 in the sense of real exchange rate inuence on the output gap, but market exibility necessary to trigger shifts in REER remains below the standards in New Keynesian empirical literature. They also suggest that the risk of the real interest rate eect is additionally reduced by low output gap responsiveness to country-specic real interest rates and mainly results from intrinsic ination persistence. Our model does not conrm the existence of a premium when foreign markets are more rigid in relative terms. Promoting market exibility, combating intrinsic ination persistence and anchoring ination expectations remain the main challenges for policymakers.
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Over the recent years, much research attention has been concentrated on the adjustment process after asymmetric shocks hitting a single country in a monetary union. This is obviously due to launch of the euro area in 1999. A common monetary policy spans there a set of countries exhibiting a high degree of heterogeneity. Structural cross-country differentials increase the probability of asymmetric demand and supply shocks and imply asymmetric propagation of common shocks. As these cannot be absorbed on the national level via autonomous monetary policy or nominal exchange rate dynamics, smooth adjustment of ination and output to their equilibrium values challenges other macroeconomic mechanisms to a greater extent.
Two most widely discussed ones are real interest rate eect and competitiveness channel. The former is not an adjustment channel in the strict sense, but it results from the membership in a monetary union and belongs to macroeconomic process induced by asymmetric developments. Common nominal interest rates, possibly decoupled from country-specic equilibrium levels, act procyclically in the short run in the presence of ination dierentials. The latter channel is expected to provide an economy with a stabilizing force in the long run, but the timing and eciency of this stabilization remains vague in the up-to-date empirical literature. Both mechanisms are widely discussed in the context of empirically persistent ination dierentials in EMU, inducing signicant competitiveness shifts on the one hand and translating into heterogenous ination expectations on the other.
Why should ination rates dier in a persistent way?
1 First of all, this can be a result of an asymmetric shock hitting only a subset of currency area economies. Asymmetric shocks have attracted much attention in the OCA literature (de Grauwe, 2005) . Section 3 presents a survey of the literature on EMU attempting at identifying such shocks.
2 From our point of view, consequences of such asymmetric developments for expected and actual ination are essential. In the model considered in this paper, two types of asymmetric shocks are incorporated: demand shocks as disturbances to the output gap (translating later into inationary pressure within the model) and supply shocks as exogenous costpush shifts in ination, in the spirit of basic New Keynesian model (e.g. Clarida et al., 2001) .
Secondly, even common shocks can be propagated in a dierent way due to crosscountry structural dierentials. Such an economic heterogeneity is, to a greater or lesser extent, an intrinsic feature of any currency area. EMU, however, as a currency union of 1 A vast battery of literature is focused on ination dierentials in EMU. In-depth treatment can be found e. g. in European Central Bank (2003) ; Honohan and Lane (2003, 2004) ; Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) ; European Central Bank (2005); Altissimo et al. (2005) ; Canzoneri et al. (2005) ; Hofmann and Remsperger (2005); Beck et al. (2006) ; MacDonald and Wójcik (2006) . 2 For a typology of shocks, see e.g. Borowski (2001) .
politically independent countries attracts particual attention. Cross-country heterogeneity is discussed both from the ECB perspective (how to cunduct a common monetary policy and whether one size ts all, see e.g. Brissimis and Skotida, 2008 ) and a single country standpoint (whether the ECB policy is suitable for an economy, see Calmfors, 2007) . However, macroeconomic divergence in a monetary union is also, to an extent, an artefact of eective adjustment mechanisms at work. Traistaru-Siedschlag (2006) , Roubini et al. (2007) , Lane (2006) and Wójcik (2008) discuss the issue of cross-country dierentials being both a source and a consequence of adjustment processes considered here. Our GMM estimates of hybrid IS and Phillips curves, reecting to some extent the up-to-date experience of the monetary union, cover a relatively wide range of parameter values over countries and imply various adjustment speed and loss in terms of output gap and ination variance.
Thirdly, structural issues (e.g. Balassa-Samuelson eect) can imply long-run dierentials. As such, they should not be part of the analysis in this context. In our model, persistent dierentials in expected ination or even in natural interest rates allow the system to remain stable, provided that their eect on output gap are counterbalanced by over-or undervalued real exchange rates. This implies a switch to a new steady state, with common nominal interest rate and a correction in equlibrium price level dierentials, once a country joins a currency union.
From the perspective of a country planning to join the euro area, two questions arise in this context: (i) is the real interest rate eect posing a threat to macroeconomic stability of an economy and what does historical experience of EMU countries tell us about this and (ii) under which conditions is the competitiveness channel going to be eective and how long and costly is it going to take for an asymmetric shock to be absorbed. Theoretical and empirical assessment of these questions is the main motivation of this paper. Building on the New-Keynesian framework, we set up a simple model that allows us to replicate the main features of macroeconomic adjustment in the aftermath of asymmetric shocks, described in the literature on EMU. We also take an empirical look at the main determinants of the adjustment path. Mechanisms such as competitiveness channel, trade linkages, rationality of expectations and -to a various extent -common monetary policy ensure eective stabilisation of the output gap after an asymmetric shock, but the speed of adjustment depends on the degree of forward-lookingness in the economy, market exibility, openness of economies and strength of monetary transmission. The risk and size of real interest rate eect depends on both output gap responsiveness to countryspecic real interest rate and the mechanism of forming expectations, whereby estimates of the appropriate parameter are often insignicant. The real exchange rate channel can be disentangled into (i) ination responsiveness to output gap -empirically sluggish in most of the euro area countries and (ii) output gap responsiveness to real exchange rate over-or undervaluation, whose estimates remain on the optimistic side. This should also partly immunize the economies to real interest rate eect, even in the short run.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents both channels in detail, and reviews the aspects of heterogeneity that matter for the adjustment dynamics. A survey of empirical literature on asymmetric macroeconomic developments in EMU is presented briey in Section 3. Section 4 develops a simple New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, encompassing both channels in question. GMM estimates of the parameters are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses consequences of heterogeneity in key parameter values for the adjustment process and Section 7 concludes.
2 Macroeconomic adjustment in a heterogenous currency union
We analyze the adjustments to asymmetric developments within a model encompassing two major mechanisms discussed in the literature: real interest rate channel (subsection 2.1) and real exchange rate channel (subsection 2.2). The former is not indeed an adjustment mechanism, as it acts procyclically and is expected to boost the amplitude and persistence of asymmetric shocks. It must be, however, taken into consideration as a potential impediment to smooth adjustment dynamics, especially in an environment where persistent ination dierentials potentially translate into heterogenous ination expectations across countries. In the following two subsections, we shortly summarize the main idea of both mechanisms, along with methodological diculties arising around them. We leave beyond the scope of this paper a number of other adjustment mechanisms, such as risk sharing in nancial markets 3 , scal policy instruments 4 or labour market mobility.
The last one is generally considered to play a limited role between the euro area countries.
Although we do not explicitly model or discuss labour market exibility here, one can treat it as a necessary condition for a quick response of prices to output gap.
Real interest rate channel
Enumerating real interest rate channel among adjustment mechanisms within a monetary union is indeed misleading: it is, at least at the theoretical level, an automatic destabiliser. Its work, however, needs to be taken into account when smoothness of adjustment within a monetary union is evaluated. The roots of the debate date back to Wicksell (1907) who considers an inherent instability of prices when banks' nominal rate would be xed below or above its normal level for some reason. He argues they would be rising to innity or converging towards zero, respectively. What he called an abstract 3 See e.g. Asdrubali et al. (1996) ; Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001 , 2003 , 2004 ; Imbs (2004); Afonso and Furceri (2007) . 4 See Hoeller et al. (2002) .
statement comparable with the collapse of the Solar System as Sun's attraction ceases (as there is no reason to try this out), came back in the context of european monetary integration. Walters (1994) argued that liberalizing capital ows within a monetary union would equalize short-term nominal rates across the union (a fact that we are accustomed ex post to consider obvious) which would reduce the real interest rate in a country with high ination, inducing even more demand-side pressure on prices and hence further boosting ination (Walters critique).
Contemporary understanding of the real interest rate mechanizm as procyclical channel on the country level in a monetary union, as in Lane (2006), European Commission (2006), Roubini et al. (2007) , Wójcik (2008) , remains in line with the main logic of Wicksell and Walters. As in ordinary IS curve, output gap increases (decreases) as real interest rate falls (grows) as households are more (less) motivated to raise today's consumption, producers nd more (less) incentive to invest, a rise in discount factor raises the wealth of households and improves balance sheet positions of rms, providing them with further incentives to consume or invest. 5 Real interest rate is the cost of consuming or investing today instead of tomorrow; borrowing money for this consumption at nominal rate of interest is a cost partially oset by the loss of its value over this period, evaluated at the time of decision making (ination expectations). When money depreciates at a various pace across countries (ination dierentials), ination expectations are closely linked to country level ination rates and short-term nominal rate remains equal, real rates vary. A high ination economy experiences therefore lower real interest rates, which -within the IS curve framework -raise the pace of product growth over potential and causes additional inationary pressure (see Figure 1 for a stylized scheme). Deroose et al. (2004) also suggest that cycles could be amplied by myopic and current sentiment determined behaviour of economic agents in assessing protability of investment project and consumption prospects: in a period of overheating it is too optimistic (as producers extrapolate their products' favourable price developments into the future and consumers expect further dynamic wage growth), in an undercooled economy -too pesimistic. Empirically, this argument remains in line with real interest rate eect described above. The authors additionally discuss the link between macroeconomic and nancial cycle, emphasizing the reinforcing eect of the latter on the former one.
Does this inherent instability have to be eectively at work? Not necessarily, at least for 3 reasons.
1. Firstly, economic agents do not know ex ante how much money will depreciate and hence what the real cost of the acceleration in consumption or investment will be.
What we know ex post as observable dierence between nominal interest rate and ination rate (ex post real interest rate) remains unknown for the agents at the time 5 Deroose et al. (2004) suggest that wealth eect is of particuar importance in this context. (Woodford, 2006; Benati, 2008; Pisani-Ferry et al., 2008; Calmfors and Johansson, 2002) suggest that, in a monetary regime such as EMU, intrinsic persistence is endogenously losing signicance and inationary expectations are well anchored. According to the European Commission (2006) that compares ex post and ex ante approach 6 , ex ante real interest rates exhibit less dispersion over countries and decline in their dispersion in the rst years of EMU was more marked. However, the issue of expectations measurement leaves this eld open for discussion.
Secondly, dierentials in ination across EMU member coutnries partially result
from structural factors, such as the catching-up process in some of the economies.
Due to Balassa-Samuelson eect and price level convergence, these economies may experience higher ination and therefore lower interest rates. At the same time,
catching-up countries are considered to have higher natural interest rates with higher marginal productivity of capital. This would suggest that the real interest rate 6 Using headline ination and Consensus Economics forecast average respectively. mechanism could even be more pro-cyclical given this aspect of heterogeneity, even if ination expectations were homogenous. Although there are many publications dealing with the natural rate of interest within the euro area, the question of natural rate variability across its member states and its consequences is not yet explored in depth. 7 3. Thirdly, the real interest rate mechanism is based on the assumption that there is a country-specic real rate of interest is based on country-specic ination expectations: Further methodological diculties include the following issues:
• Heterogeneity of agents with respect to basis for ination expectations can be assumed, as suggested by the European Commission (2006, p. 138) : CPI for consumers, PPI for producers, foreign CPI or PPI for exporters. This additionally complicates the analysis.
• Further doubts are raised by arbitrary choice of short-term market interest rates, strongly inuenced by common monetary policy. European Commission (2006) suggests long-term interest rates as another possibility, especially in economies where long-term nancing plays a dominant role. However, given the institutional setup of the euro area monetary policy, there is also no reason for for long rates to diverge (Wójcik, 2008) .
• Equality of nominal interest rates really faced by economic agents is questioned as well. Single policy rate, almost identical money market rates and strongly converged 7 Catao and Mackenzie (2006) provide 'implicit equilibrium interst rates' based on Gordon equation.
bond yields do not yet imply homogenous nancing conditions for retail customers.
As European Central Bank (2006) shows, there are persistent and nonnegligible differences in loan and deposit rates, leading e.g. to higher rates in Greece, Portugal and Italy. According to the calculations of the European Commission (2006), however, this source of variability is much less signicant for the country-specic ex post real rates than ination dierentials.
All these caveats render the mechanism dicult to measure and verify empirically. Nonetheless, there are theoretical and empirical analyses suggesting which countries have already been or could potentially be exposed to negative inuence of this mechanism. The ECB nominal rate reaction depends on the area-wide conditions. Theoretically, this creates a risk of destabilization, mainly in low-weighting economies (Hoeller et al., 2002 ). Roubini et al. (2007 also point to countries with a high degree of intrinsic ination persistence as candidates for overheating or overcooling. According to Deroose et al. (2004) , labour and product market rigidities are potentially supportive factors for the size and dynamics of temporary cycle amplication via the real interest rate channel.
Finally, many of the authors mentioned above suggest that relative importance of the real interest rate channel is expected to decline as endogenous changes in EMU economies progress: uniformization of monetary transmission mechanisms and internalization of ECB policy by economic agents could reduce heterogeneity in ination expectations and ination rates themselves, business cycle synchronization should rise, intra-EMU trade increase and risk sharing mechanisms develop. However, the ndings of Arnold and Kool (2004) with respect to the US economy (see Section 3) raise some doubts over complete negligibility of this channel in the long run.
Competitiveness channel
Competitiveness channel is an automatic stabilizer, counterbalancing the overheating or overcooling eect of real interest rate eect described in Subsection 2.1. As part of market-based adjustment in a monetary union, it is often labeled as 'real exchange rate channel' (Roubini et al., 2007) and is expected to be the main compensation for the loss of autonomous monetary policy. Economic adjustment is based here on external competitiveness of an economy, dependent on the real exchange rate:
To organize the way we think of exchange rates in our analysis, Table 1 summarizes the determinants of various exchange rates at the level of entire union and its member states. Once a monetary union is created, bilateral (or intra-EMU eective) real exchange rates countinue to exist as price level ratios between countries (N ER i = const, see last column in Table 1 ). Every country's REER, idiosyncratically shaped both by tradeweighting and the internal deator, is inuencing a country's output gap by improving or deteriorating a country's external price competitiveness. Although the competitiveness of an economy, as measured by REER vis-a-vis the rest of the world, is determined by all external deators, external value of the euro, a country's trade composition and domestic price dynamics, competitiveness channel as adjustment mechanism rests on the price level ratio (or, equivalently, log-dierence) against other EMU member states. This is why we concentrate on the lower-right cell of Table 1 in this analysis. The key question in the assessment of the real interest rate versus exchange rate interplay is the net eect of both channels over time. Competitiveness channel is commonly considered to dominate the real interest rate channel in the mid-to long term. in real exchange rate response to negative and positive output gap. Appreciation of the real exchange rate, when necessary, runs more quickly and a depreciation is much more heterogenous across countries, especially in services (considered a proxy for the non-tradeables sector).
Another dimension that needs to be taken into account when considering the competitiveness channel are productivity developments. Major increases in labour productivity, associated with catching-up and structural reforms, are non-negligible as they oset the negative impact of price dynamics on competitiveness. Ireland is a good example of this: given high productivity dynamics and wage restraint, substantial ination dynamics over the EMU lifetime did not translate there into substantial losses in competitiveness. (2006) uses unit labour cost dynamics to evaluate trends in competitiveness. In the empirical analysis in this paper, we use the price subindices of goods (overall HICP excluding services).
For this reason, European Commission
Is this mechanism a sucient insurance against a possible destabilization resulting from real interest rates? Again, a few methodological diculties on the way to the answer can be enumerated:
1. Asymmetric weights in the trade structures (trade with EMU and non-EMU countries, as in Table 1 and Figure 3b ) might imply various degree of eectiveness of this adjustment channel. A country with a low share of EMU countries in foreign trade might be relatively indierent to real exchange rate dynamics vis-a-vis the rest of the currency area and much more dependent on the external value of the euro.
However, rising domestic prices deteriorate competitiveness position of a country against both EMU and non-EMU trade partners.
2. Real interest rate mechanism acts procyclically via internal demand, while real exchange rate channel depends on external demand conditions. Therefore, competitiveness channel could rather be expected to be at work in small economies with a high degree of openness. However, the higher the weight of an economy in a monetary union, the more chance for stabilization from monetary policy. 
Empirical analysis is

Structural heterogeneity
Not only do cross-country structural dierentials in EMU increase the probability of asymmetric shocks, but they also determine various adjustment patterns once such a shock occurs. This subsection provides an overview of how various characteristics of an economy might inuence the pace of coming back to the steady state. Stylized facts described here will be accounted for in our model-based simulations as heterogeneity in parameters between monetary union member countries.
Trivially, dierences in a country size (w j for country j in the model, see section 4) could be a source of dierences in the adjustment speed. Hoeller et al . (2004) show that large countries are less capable of a smooth market-based adjustment than small ones.
This is due to the fact that internal demand plays a dominant role and the degree of openness is generally smaller. In our framework, this implies a higher β r,j /β c,j ratio if country j is large. Moreover, Marzinotto (2007) emphasizes that agents in small open economies normally discount in expectations competitiveness losses resulting from excessive wage and price growth, as they have highly depended on external demand long before a monetary union was created (high β c,j ). On the other hand, a high country weight results in a stronger response of the common monetary policy.
Secondly, the key issue in country adjustment dynamics is price (wage) exibility in the product (labour) market. In our framework, this aspect of heterogeneity is captured in the λ j parameters reecting ination responsiveness to cyclical conditions. Switching to deep parameters as in Galí and Gertler (1999) , it depends on the Calvo (1983) parameter of market rigidities. OECD's product market regulation (PMR) indicators provide some further descriptive evidence of the distortions in price response to shocks. Price adjustments also depend on the input cost (especially wage) exibility. Labour market institutions in the euro area are designed mainly on the country level. Campolmi and Faia (2007) describe them as a signicant source of ination dierentials in a monetary union. They show that in a country with lower replacement rate, workers face a more expensive 'outside option' and are more willing to accept lower wages; as a result, wage and price volatility is higher at the cost of output and employment volatility in the aftermath of a shock. Also, Andersen (2008) analyzes labour market rigidities (especially with respect to wage formation and contract duration) as a factor increasing output volatility, whereby cross-country heterogeneity leads to asymmetric propagation of symmetric shocks. A number of descriptive evidence on various labour market exibility aspects can be enumerated, including OECD EPL indicators (OECD, 2004) or summary indicators developed by HM Treasury (2003).
Dierences in the monetary transmission mechanism are another factor that determines not only adjustment speed (mainly how strong the real interest rate channel amplies the cycle), but also lead to asymmetric propagation of common monetary policy impulses. In our framework, a high β r,j indicates a strong transmission in country j. This source of heterogeneity is mainly associated with dierent institutional setup of the nancial markets. Hoeller and Rae (2007) more open economy with a lower share of EMU-trade is relatively more exposed to shocks associated with external value of the euro (see asymmetries associated with REER weighting as indicated in Table 1 ). Competitiveness channel within the monetary union, in turn, is expected to be more ecient with high trade integration of the member countries, being a combination of both a high degree of openness and a high share of trade volume with EMU partners. In terms of our model, this results in high output vulnerability to real exchange rate divergences (β c ) and high responsiveness of the output gap to other countries' cyclical position (β s ), increasing business cycle synchronisation and the probability of common monetary policy response. Also, catching-up economies can be expected to exhibit higher natural rates of interest, r * j , as marginal productivity of capital stays below the level typical for more advanced economies.
3 Empirical ndings from the literature Since the launch of the EMU, the subject of adjustment to asymmetric shocks has inspired a lot of empirical research. Synthetic empirical ndings on both discussed mechanisms remain limited. Angeloni (2007), European Commission (2008) and Ehrmann (2004) member economy to an asymmetric demand and competitiveness shock, the authors conclude with a number of policy implications to smooth the adjustment process: structural reforms promoting labour and product market exibility, promoting further trade and nancial integration (to support the market-based competitiveness channel against the real interest rate mechanism), wage moderation policies and automatic scal stabilizers.
In a paper by Arnold and Kool (2004) , regional adjustment and regional heterogeneity in monetary policy transmission in the United States of America (considered as a monetary union) is analyzed. The authors nd evidence in support of the existence of real interest rate's destabilizing eects due to regional ination dierentials. They also arrive at an interesting quantitative conclusion that the real interest rate eect outweighs the real exchange rate channel within 3-4 years and, after that, the negative consequences of competitiveness losses dominate. 4 The model 
Aggregate layer -monetary policy reactions
The nominal interest rate is set on the aggregate level, basing on the macroeconomic performance of entire euro area (union-wide output gap y t and ination π t ). We use a simple Taylor (1993) rule with smoothing to approximate the ECB decisions 10 :
ρ is a smoothing parameter of the ECB, γ π and γ y -relative weights attributed to current ination and output gap respectively, r * -the natural rate of interest for the aggregate euro area and π * -the ination target of the ECB. We assume the natural interest rate and the ination target to be invariant over time.
Aggregating identities -input for monetary policy decisions
Union-wide output gap (y t ) and ination (π t ) are aggregated over member countries (y j,t , π j,t ) according to the vector of weights reported by the ECB: 9 The Authors estimate a 9-equation system with 3 IS curves, Phillips curves and Taylor rules for Germany, France and Italy in the pre-EMU period. 10 For an extensive set of Taylor rule estimates for the ECB, see e.g. Sauer and Sturm (2003) .
We apply constant weights (w j ) for these identities. This is not exactly the case in reality: Eurostat reports a set of country weights every year and they slightly evolve to be a really constraining assumption, we should bear it in mind when interpreting the results of the analysis for particular countries. In the long run, shifts in weights could be substantial. It needs to be stressed here that this weighting scheme, associated with ocial euro-area accounting, assumes no national focus of the decision makers at the ECB 11 .
Country layer -output gap and ination
Our model remains in line with New Keynesian literature on empirical modelling of IS and Phillips curves, including Galí and Gertler (1999) , Goodhart and Hofmann (2005) or
Lindé (2005).
Following Galí and Gertler (1999) 12 , we prefer a hybrid version of the Phillips curve, including both lagged and rationally expected ination rate. In our estimation and simulations, we restrict the parameters of past and expected ination to sum to unity. This allows our steady state to replicate from period to period in the absence of shocks.
π j,t = ω f,j E t π j,t+1 + ω b,j π j,t−1 + γy j,t + ε π,j,t
An autocorrelation in the error term is allowed, naturally present by construction in models with rational expectations.
13
ε π,j,t = ρ π,j ε π,j,t−1 + η π,j,t
Our output gap equation for country j resembles the standard hybrid specication considered by Goodhart and Hofmann (2005) , including expected future and lagged out-11 For a discussion of alternative institutional setup with rotation in the Governing Council and national bias in decisions, based on the same model, see Kosior et al. (2008) . 12 The only exception being that we replace real marginal cost, that Galí and Gertler (1999) apply, with the current level of the output gap. 13 Assuming that the dierence between expectations and the true value is white noise, π t+1 = E t π t+1 + u t+1 , we conclude with an error term of the form ε π,t − ω f u t+1 .
put gap, as well as the dierence between current country-specic ex ante real interest rate (i t − E t π j,t+1 ) and the natural interest rate (r * j ). 14 Firstly, the output gap in the rest of the union (y −j,t ), controls for external demand in a highly trade-integrated environment. Secondly, the competitiveness term (P j,t − P −j,t )
incorporates the real exchange rate channel into the model, lowering the output gap when cumulative price growth in country j is excessive. P j,t stands for a cumulated price growth since entering the monetary union and evolves according to the following:
P −j,t denotes the foreign (to country j ) counterpart of P j,t , calculated as a weighted average over the rest of the countries 15 :
Two modications need to be applied to this term in the IS curve. A one-o relative price level adjustment in country j (θ * j ) is required. Real appreciation or depreciation is necessary to correct for the heterogeneity of r * j and π * j with homogenous i in the union's steady state. This counterbalances the steady-state eect of real interest rates heterogeneity, as described in subsection 2.1:
However, a change in relative prices does not always aect the competitiveness of a country. Indeed, the real convergence between member states of the currency union requires -through the Balassa-Samuelson eect -real appreciation (or depreciation) of the 14 However, whereas in the framework of Clarida et al. (2001) the nominal exchange rate plays a critical role in restoring equilibrium, it is no longer valid in the monetary union regime, which is considered in our study. 15 Price level outside country j is treated as weighted average of other monetary union countries. This is a convenient assumption for the simulations, but we must bear in mind that asymmetric trade composition (see Table 1 ) might result in particular vulnerability to competitiveness losses against the main trading partners. This subject requires a country-by-country analysis and remains beyond the scope of this paper. exchange rate as a part of the equilibrium process in a relatively less (more) developed economy. Distinct equilibrium paths of relative prices are reected in the dierences between implicit ination targets of currency union member states (π * j ). We account for this fact in simulations by assuming that a quarterly price growth consistent with the annualized real exchange rate appreciation (or depreciation) of π * j − π * −j is an equilibrium phenomenon and does not inuence the output gap of a country j.
Like P −j,t , other variables (y, π) that are associated with all countries of the monetary union except j are subscripted -j and constructed as weighted average over these countries:
Steady state
The steady state solution to the model replicates from period to period in the absence of shocks. Output gaps are obviously zero and each country's ination rate is equal to the countr-specic ination target (π * j ). Every country has got its own natural rate of interest (r * j ) and we know pairwise dierences between countries' own ination targets (deviating from the ECB target of 2% due to Balassa-Samuelson eect).
Given the values of π * j − π * 1 for countries 2, 3, ..., 12 and π * as ination target for the entire monetary union, we simply solve for π * j for every country.
.
Taking additionally r * j for n countries, we solve for equilibrium value of i * for the whole union and countries' one-o equilibrium price level adjustments, as in (11): 16 16 The rst 12 equations are based on IS curves with equilibrium values. The last one reects the arithmetical fact that the (weighted) sum of deviations from the (weighted) average is zero. Knowing that P *
Multiplying this by 1 − w j yields P * j − j w j P * j , which is deviation of P * j from weighted average over j. Weighted sum of these deviations equals zero.
One of the price levels must be assumed. With dierentiated natural rates of interest and ination targets, price level dierences between countries are necessary for the system to remain stable on the country level. Enforcing equal prices across countries in this situation is unstable, as real interest rate mechanism begins to work and shifts price levels apart to their steady state deviations.
Solution of the RE model
To solve the model with rational expectations, we apply an algorithm proposed by Söderlind (1999) . We write the model as
and use matrices A 0 and A 1 − BF as an input into the procedure, based on Schur decomposition. Technical details are provided in Appendix A.
Empirical results
An empirical assessment of the true heterogeneity in parameters discussed in Sections 2.3 and 4 is dicult, above all due to short time series. 10 years of EMU experience provided us with about one business cycle, but 40 quarterly observations are rather insucient for methods that require large samples. This is why the results need to be treated with prudence, as not all the parameters are signicantly dierent from zero.
Data
Output gap data is taken from the OECD database, as percentage deviation from the potential production. Because this series is annual, we perform the following interpolation:
we use this data to calculate potential output for each country (from annual GDP reported by Eurostat), then interpolate it into quarterly potential output in a linear way.
17 Quarterly output gap is nally calculated as percentage deviation of quarterly (Eurostat's) real GDP from the potential interpolated value.
As country price indices, we use ECB's data on HICP (which allows to compare consumer prices both across countries and in time). We select this price index also as the ECB target (because our model contains only one price index for every country).
However, we do not base our estimations of IS curves on log-dierence of HICP indices in a country and in the rest of the euro area due to well-known issues of productivity dierentials between sectors and Balassa-Samuelson eect. Instead, we use terms of trade calculated as log-dierence of HICP goods subindices of a country and abroad, considered as a proxy for price dynamics in the tradable sector. In the simulations, we use the IS curve specication from (8) with constant linear appreciation (or depreciation) in real exchange rate. This approach is equivalent to the one adopted in estimation under the assumption that exogenous productivity dierential between both sectors is constant over time and translates into constant relative price growth in one country that does not induce shifts in its external price competitiveness.
As nominal interest rates, we use 3-month money market rate series for the euro area reported by Eurostat. We also use Eurostat's nominal wage index (wages and salaries), real unit labour cost index, nominal eective exchange rates and real GDP volume index, as well as ECB's oil price index (EUR) to include in the instrument sets.
Parameter estimates
In order to take empirical insight in the adjustment process inside the currency union, we estimate the parameters of the system described in Section 4. Models with rational expectations are commonly estimated by means of generalized method of moments (GMM), applied in the seminal paper by Galí and Gertler (1999) . The assumption that economic agents expect rationally, i.e. do not commit systematic errors conditional on the information set available to them at the moment of prediction, leads to orthogonality conditions for GMM. The information set is contained in the instrument matrix. Selecting instruments for each country's IS and Phillips curves, we follow to a large extent Goodhart and Hofmann (2005) in the former and Galí and Gertler (1999) • lags of output gap, real (ex post) interest rate, real GDP growth, terms of trade, foreign output gap and HICP ination for the IS curve.
Contrary to existing closed-economy empirical work, we decided to include lagged terms of trade and foreign output gap in the instrument set for the IS curve. We also use nominal eective exchange rate log-change to control for import price dynamics, in the spirit of Rumler (2007) who uses import price to wage ratios. It must be stressed, however, that GMM estimates need to be interpreted carefully. The sample is very short for such an estimation technique (it starts around 1998q1, with slight deviations between countries, and ends in 2008q1) and the conclusions we can draw are mainly qualitative, in the light of sensitivity of output response reported in our simulations. Importantly, due to lack of proper time series, Phillips curves for Greece and Portugal were not instrumented by real ULC growth. Table 3 contains the estimates of model parameters. In none of the cases, the J test rejected the set of overidentifying restrictions. 
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This is far below 0.13 proposed by Lindé (2005) Finally, in Portugal, where adjustment is widely considered to have been a painful and prolongued process, neither of the key estimates was statistically signicant. As our baseline value for simulations, we apply β c = 0.04 again as median value over valid estimates.
A more nuanced picture emerges from the estimates of β r , output gap response to country-specic real interest rate. (2005). A high degree of heterogeneity in β r is negative on the one hand, as it implies asymmetric monetary transmission. However, countries with low output gap response to their country-specic real interest rate are less exposed to the real interest rate eect. An additional GMM estimation of the IS curve for the euro area as a whole resulted in β r = 0.041 signicant with p-value 0.061, conrming that this parameter is signicant for the entire monetary union at the same time.
18 From this perspective, limited response on the country level remains good news for the adjustment process on the country level.
Finally, other euro area countries' aggregate output gap has a signicant and positive inuence on domestic output gap in most of the cases. Incorrect sign for Greece is probably due to very short time series available (only since 2000), which limits the reliability of these estimates. Insignicant estimate of β s for Ireland also does not surprise, given the low share of trade with EMU partners depicted in Figure 3 . In most of the other cases, valid β s around the median of 0.09 is estimated. A very high estimate of 0.27 in the case of Luxembourg also remains in line with our expectations: in this very small economy, the foreign output gap seems to be the main driver of the domestic one.
To sum up, our empirical ndings provide some evidence of both real exchange rate and real interest rate mechanism being eectively at work. In the following sections, we use the values obtained to take a more detailed look at how various aspects of heterogeneity inuence an adjustment of an asymmetric shock.
6 Consequences of heterogeneity -simulation excercise 6 .1 Asymmetric shocks -baseline scenario Before we proceed to analyzing how heterogeneity in parameters aects the adjustment path, we shall take more insight into how both channels considered within our model determine the output gap (and other variables') response to asymmetric shocks in the baseline scenario. Baseline parameter values are not far from the consensus of New-Keynesian literature (see e.g. Lindé, 2005 for a survey-based set of values) and were based on our estimates discussed in Section 5. On top of that, we assume a Talyor rule with a 1.5 to 1 response to ination's deviation to the ECB target (2%) and 0.5 to 1 response to current output gap. Following Lindé (2005), we also allow for autocorrelation of 0.5 in demand shocks. For simplicity of exposition, we consider here a 10-country monetary union with country weights 0.1, focusing on consequences of asymmetric shocks and parameter value deviations in one of them. The set of parameters used in this Subsection is summarized in Table 4 . Responses to a unit inflation shock, country 1 Inflation Output RER Interest rate Source: author A surprise increase in output gap in one of the countries (Figure 4a) is immediately followed by a rise in ination. Agents promptly take into account that the shock is autocorrelated, output gap -intrinsically persistent and output gaps between countries correlate due to trade linkages. After 2-3 quarters, the output gap still exceeds the impact response as growing ination rate boosts ination expectations and the real interest rate eect sets in. Cumulative price growth undermines, however, the country's price competitiveness and output gap starts decreasing, closing itself within around 6 quarters.
Persistence of ination and output gap also cause overshooting of output's and ination's equilibrium levels. Note only very limited response of common monetary policy to this asymmetric shock.
An adverse supply shock, associated here with exogenous surge in ination, immediately hits the output due to appreciating real exchange rate (see Figure 4b) . In a small economy, there is very little central bank reaction. Key adjustment mechanisms are again the real exchange rate channel and agents' forward-looking behaviour. The output gap remains negative until its eect on disination is strong enough to improve competitiveness through a country's real depreciation. Note that such adverse supply shocks are particularly dangerous in a small economy without its own monetary policy.
How heterogeneity aects adjustment -sensitivity analysis
In order to take better insight into the determinants of the adjustment speed, we examine the sensitivity of the adjustment path presented in Subsection 6.1 to dierent parameter values in the model. We consider ranges for parameter values observed in our estimates (Table 3) and present in the existing literature. This allows us to disentangle dierentials in adjustment capacity of dierent countries into separate parameter values. We con- Source: author sider for simplicity a monetary union with countries of equal size 0.1 and, unless stated otherwise, we assign baseline parameter values to all countries except the one hit by an asymmetric shock, changing one (or more) of parameters in this economy to examine the sensitivity of adjustment path. Graphs on the left-hand side depict adjustments after demand shocks (to output gap), on the right-hand side -after supply shocks (to ination).
As expected, amplitude of output gap reaction is somewhat lower when an asymmetric demand shock hits a big country ( Figure 5) . Although there is obviously dierence in reaction between a country participating in a monetary union and staying outside it, the dierences in adjustment pattern are not extremely pronounced over the range of country weights in EMU, at least in comparison to other aspects of variability. The dierence in reactions after a supply shock is even less pronounced (note dierent scales on both graphs). This conrms that common monetary policy plays a limited role in the adjustment process even if a country is considered big for EMU standards (Germany's weight amounts to approximately 30%) and casts doubts on results emphasizing big qualitative dierences in big and small countries' position under common monetary policy, provided that country weights in this policy really reect relative sizes of economies in terms of GDP.
Forward-looking behaviour in the Phillips curve seems to be critical for the adjustment process (see Figure 6) . The higher is the weight of rational expectations in the Phillips curve (at the cost of lagged ination), the smoother is the adjustment path. Note that in the initial phase after a demand shock, the dierence in ination persistence does not matter very much; however, when the forward-looking component is strongly dominating the rule-of-thumb price setting based on past ination, a unit demand shock is almost smoothed within 8-9 quarters. With strong ination persistence, the risk of overshooting Output response to a unit inflation shock 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.7 0.8 0 .9 Source: author the equilibrium levels and long boom-bust cycles grows. After a unit supply shock, a period of subdued output growth (output gap slightly less than 0) continues for a few quarters, but the output variability remains very limited when expectations are highly rational. The model is particularly sensitive to the degree of backward-lookingness in the Phillips curve, with intrinsic ination persistence parameter above 0.6 destabilizing the system. Interestingly, already a value below 0.5 (and absolutely below 0.4) ensures smooth adjustment. This is visible both for output and ination shocks.
The mechanism of forming expectations is fundamental for assessing the risk of procyclical real interest rate eect. In Figure 7 , we repeat the simulations from Figure 6 with ination expectations in the IS curve are partly rational and partly static.
Rational expectations E t π R t+1 assume absence of any systematic prediction errors. Note that this additional inclusion of 1−α fraction of static expectations will introduce into the IS curve, lagged ination with coecient −β r (1 − α). In simulations presented in Figure   7 , both degree of forward-lookingness of the Phillips curve and the composition of ination expectations in the IS curve (rational versus static) were changed in line (α j = ω f,j ) 19 .
Stabilizing eect of more rational expectations can be observed even more clearly than in Figure 6 , when analogous lines are compared.
Forward-looking behaviour in the IS curve (β f , Figure 8 ) is also critical for dampening the variance of output after both demand and supply asymmetric shocks. Note that this 19 In our GMM estimations and all other simulation exercises, we assume purely rational expectations and do not include lagged ination into real interest rate term in the IS curve. Source: author is the only case when we register very dierent responses at impact and in the initial quarters. If the backward-looking behaviour in the IS curve is low enough, the humpshaped response (partly attributable to real interest rate eect) diminishes and rational agents smooth the shock after only 4-5 quarters. On the contrary, highly persistent output gap boosts the variance and increases the risk of overshooting the equilibrium levels after both types of shocks.
As emphasized before, exible price reactions is necessary for the competitiveness channel to work. Figure 9 presents the sensitivity of the adjustment process to dierent values of ination responsiveness to the output gap. In line with the existing literature, that usually ends up with policy recommendation to promote market exibility, as our exercise conrms high variance of real variables when product and labour markets are rigid enough to prevent prices from quick adjustment to excess demand. With our median over valid estimates of γ = 0.06, output gap starts falling 3-4 quarters after a positive demand shock when competitiveness channel outweighs the real interest rate eect. More exible markets reduce the output gap growth in the rst quarters, accelerating the real exchange rate channel's response, but the amplitude and overshooting pattern remain similar. The adjustment to adverse supply shocks is long and painful when the initial loss in competitiveness is not quickly oset by disination due to falling output gap. When the markets are rigid, recession needs to be deep in order to induce sucient real depreciation.
Another exercise associated with exibility, presented in Figure 10 , casts some doubt on HM Treasury (2003) conclusion that relative price exibility (dierence versus the rest of the monetary union) also matters for the adjustment process. The report suggests that a country's advantage in terms of market exibility over the rest of a monetary union results in a premium for this country. In fact, varying foreign market exibility (be it less, Source: author equal or more than in the domestic economy) does not signicantly reshape the domestic adjustment path when an assymetric shock hits the domestic economy as long as domestic γ is held constant. This conclusion remains in line with the one by Everaert and Schule (2006) , who suggest that there are no positive or negative spillover eects from reforms targeted at improving market exibility in a single country. What really matters in this model is just the domestic exibility in absolute terms.
The second element of an eective competitiveness channel in our model, output gap response to cumulative real appreciation or depreciation (β c ), plays a critical role in the speed of restoring equilibrium (see Figure 11 ). Output gap impact responses to an asymmetric demand shock vary notably, depending on how the demand for the country's production is sensitive to the real appreciation over the empirical range of β c from Table   3 . This initial dampening of output gap growth, which is able to suppress the real interest various γ and β c = 0.1 Source: author rate eect even in the short run, prevents prices from growing faster. As a result, an open and highly trade-integrated economy is very resistant to demand shocks. However, the opposite is the case with supply shocks. When ination grows exogenously, the output gap is hit particularly strongly in an economy with high β c . A deep and short recession helps to restore the equilibrium price level and production. Low β c reduces the initial response, but the variance in more advanced phases of adjustment remains similar independently on this value.
An optimum combination of both determinants of the competitiveness channel eciency, γ and β c , depends on the nature of the shock. In Figure 12 , adjustment with various combinations of both parameter values is presented. We can see there a qualitative dierence between ndings for demand and supply shocks. When an asymmetric demand shock hits an economy, the best reaction occurs under high market exibility Figure 13 : Output adjustment sensitivity to real interest rate parameter (β r in (8) Source: author and high output gap sensitivity to real exchange rate. In this case, the output gap is less volatile and the shock dies out more quickly. In the case of a supply shock, lower real exchange rate sensitivity of the output gap combined with exible markets constitutes the best scenario. On the contrary, a deep and long recession in the aftermath of an asymmetric adverse supply shock can be expected in an economy with low market exibility and high exposition to real exchange rate variations.
Turning to real interest rate eect determinants, Figure 13 suggests that lower (in absolute terms) estimates of output gap sensitivity to real interest rate (β r ) support the adjustment process after asymmetric shocks, at least with baseline values of other parameters. This means that, given the baseline parametrisation, stabilizing eects of the common monetary policy on the country level are outweighed by procyclical eects from ination expectations growth when the shock is asymmetric, conrming the existence of the real interest rate eect. Intuitively (and in line with the literature) this is especially the case when ination expectations are highly backward-looking and/or a country is very small 20 . Consequences of a monetary policy response to an asymmetric shock in a large, dominating economy might be dierent. In such a case, monetary policy might more eectively stabilize with higher β r 21 . Summing up, low or insignicant estimates of β r obtained from the data are good news, given a high degree of ination persistence in an economy, but would be welcome in a big economy with strongly rational expectations.
The sensitivity to β r might be reduced not only by lower ination persistence or higher country size. In Figure 14 , we present the interdependencies between real interest and 20 With growing country weight, the path is more indierent to β r . Simulations are available upon request. 21 Note that this is not the case for country sizes typical for the euro area. Again, institutional nuances that might nally result in dierent country weights are assumed away; see Kosior et al. (2008) for more discussion. the real rate of interest and the output gap is stronger. Strong responsiveness of the output gap to excess appreciation or depreciacion of a country's real exchange rate makes the economy more indierent to β r . As β c is high and signicant in most of the cases in our estimates, this suggests that the real interest rate eect can be partially suppressed by the real exchange rate channel even in the short run.
Finally, a high share of exports in domestic production, translating into high dependence on foreign demand, acts in a dual way. Whenever a country is hit by an asymmetric shock, the inuence of its demand on other monetary union economies helps to trigger a smoother common monetary policy action, supporting the adjustment process. However, an asymmetric shock abroad, combined with high β s at home, implies more disturbance to domestic economy. Bottom line, not much sensitivity with respect to β s itself is visible in Figure 15 , although it is denitely helpful in interactions with other parameters in triggering common monetary policy reactions when we look at the entire monetary union.
Conclusions
This paper proposes a stylized New Keynesian model of a monetary union, incorporating both the competitiveness channel and the real interest rate mechanism. It spans countries, heterogenous in terms of IS and Phillips curves, with a single monetary policy approximated by a Taylor rule operating on aggregated ination and output gaps. Rational expectations with respect both to future ination and output gap are included in the model, and the algorithm of Söderlind (1999), based on Schur decomposition and gener-alized to the case of a monetary union of any size, is used to solve the model. We show that neither heterogenous natural rates of interest nor country-specic steady-state ination targets (associated with Balassa-Samuelson eect) prevent the system from restoring equilibrium, as one-o movements in price levels, associated with real appreciation or depreciation, oset the impact of common nominal interest rate and country-specic natural interest rates or ination targets.
The smoothness and speed of adjustment after an asymmetric shock is strongly connected with heterogeneity in parameters, both in the country where the shock occurs and abroad. Our model conrms the widespread view that increasing country size supports the adjustment process with increasing reaction of common monetary policy. However, over the realistic range of country sizes in the euro area, other aspects of heterogeneity play the crucial role in the adjustment process.
The risk of cycle amplication, resulting from the real interest rate eect, is particularly high when expectations (especially ination expectations) are highly backwardlooking and rational only to a limited extent. It is particularly reinforced when the output gap is highly sensitive to country-specic (i.e. based on country level ination expectations) real interest rate. Persistence in output gap and small country size are further risk factors. Empirically, most of the estimates of output gap responsiveness to countryspecic real interest rates in EMU-12 countries are low or insignicant, showing that the risk is concentrated on the side of expectations formation mechanism.
After asymmetric demand shocks, the real exchange rate channel is particularly effective as a stabilizing mechanism when (i) markets are highly exible (which does not seem to be the case in the light of EMU-12 estimates) and (ii) the output gap responds strongly to real apprecation or depreciation. Our estimates show that the latter condition is fullled in most of the countries. When an asymmetric adverse supply shock occurs, the best combination possible is an economy where the output gap is less sensitive to real exchange rate dynamics and markets are very exible. In an economy highly sensitive to real exchange rate over-or undervaluation, rigid markets can result in a prolongued, deep recession necessary to restore competitiveness. Foreign price exibility does not seem to play a critical role in domestic adjustment process, suggesting that relative advantage in market exibility over other countries as such is not signicant for the adjustment dynamics. Last but not least, rising rationality of expectations (both with respect to output gap and ination) is a factor strongly supporting competitiveness mechanism as an adjustment channel.
For a country willing to join the euro area, such as Poland, these conclusions bear a number of implications. Their relevance is highlighted by the dierences in economic development, as well as discrepancies in production and consumption structures between Poland and the euro area (Adamowicz et al. 2008 ). The reason is that such heterogeneity may increase the likelihood of asymmetric shocks occurrence.
22 Therefore, any measures aimed at mitigating the potential costs of adjustment process should be of particular interest to the policy makers of the Polish economy. The ndings of this paper that may be useful in tackling the issue are as follows.
Firstly, as market exibility enhances the adjustment process after any kind of asymmetric shocks, structural reforms in product and labour markets are critical for due preparation to EMU accession. Although Center and Eastern European markets are considered to be more exible than those in the Western Europe (Kolasa 2008), this relative advantage is still highly insucient to cope eectively with the consequences of an asymmetric shock.
Secondly, Poland's ability to respond successfully to adverse eects of asymmetric supply shocks will largely hinge on the implementation of reforms that would strengthen the country's economic capacity (particularly on the supply-side of the labour market).
It should be stressed that the optimum time for these reforms is prior to joining the ERM II mechanism, because after that the two-handed approach with an accommodating autonomous monetary policy would no longer be possible (Everaert and Schule 2006) .
Finally, this paper emphasizes the role of expectations in the adjustment process to asymmetric shocks. In particular, the less rational are private sector expectations, the more likely is ination persistance due to, inter alia, the presence of automatic wage indexation schemes. An increase in ination persistance in turn hampers the adjustment process. Therefore, all measures aimed at mitigating the bounded rationality problem should strengthen the economy's resistance to the consequences of asymmetric shocks.
This highlights the signicance of the government and central bank communication, as well as economic education of the society in the course of the integration with the euro area.
Summing up, in the absence of autonomous monetary policy, the costs of market-based adjustment to potential asymmetric shocks will be conditional upon policymakers' (prior) eorts to prepare the Polish economy for euro area membership.
A number of questions arise for future research. Longer time series would make the GMM estimates more reliable. Further extensions of the model, such as explicit inclusion of 2 sectors in each economy and labour market rigidities, could allow to take further insights into the adjustment process, especially on the empirical level. Also, as suggested by European Commission (2006) estimates, downward nominal rigidities are a greater problem in EMU than upward price adjustments, whereby in this paper upward-and downward ones were treated symetrically. Finally, this paper suggests that empirical studies on expectation formation mechanism are critical for assessing the risk of real interest rate eect and overshooting in the adjsutment process. 22 One of which would be associated with a one-o switch to the new steady-state with area-wide nominal interest rate, as dened by equation (15). Goodhart C., Hofmann B. (2005) : The Phillips Curve, the IS Curve and Monetary Transmission: Evidence for the US and the Euro Area, CESifo Economic Studies, 51(4). (2003): UK Membership of the Single Currency. An Assessment of the Five Economic Tests.
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Appendix A -Solving the model with rational expectations To solve the model with rational expectations, we apply an algorithm proposed by Söderlind (1999) . We write the model as 
η π,12,t+1 η y,1,t+1
